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ABSTRACT 
In 1993, the Canadian federal government made a decision with respect to the direction 
that the country would take in regulating agricultural products of biotechnology, commonly 
referred to as GMOs or GM crops. Following the lead of the United States, Canada adopted the 
innovative “product-based” approach to regulation, making it necessary for all GM crops to go 
through the regulatory system in order to gain approval for commercialization. However, the 
iteration that Canada’s adoption of the policy took differed from the form that the product-based 
approach took in the United States. Canada created a category of “plants with novel traits”, 
which is based on the concept of novelty and reflects the idea that products of newer 
technologies such as recombinant DNA are not fundamentally different than those developed 
through more conventional means. The United States does not require regulation on novel plants 
created through conventional means via a regulatory trigger which seeks out plant pathogens, 
present only in newer, recombinant technologies. As a result, many crops developed through 
more conventional modification techniques such as mutagenesis are not subjected to the 
American regulatory system, but are in Canada.  
The objective of this paper is to determine how Canada and the United States came to 
adopt the product-based approach to regulation, where the Canadian system began to differ from 
the American system, and why the Canadian system has not diffused internationally, despite 
being the most directly implemented representative of the product-based approach. 
This is accomplished via the application of the policy change, policy diffusion, and 
policy innovation literatures. Theories of policy change and diffusion are introduced. I trace the 
history and diffusion of novelty using the historical method, and test the applicability of other 
diffusion models to the case study in order to determine their predictive power in an international 
diffusion scenario. The innovation literature is also applied in order to explain how and why the 
product-based approach to regulation has been incorporated differently at multiple levels of 
regulatory policy. I conclude with an argument that Canada has lost a “standards war” with the 
United States for regulatory superiority, in light of lost marketability and a less permissible 
regulatory landscape, which must prompt us to re-evaluate our regulatory approach. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Policies exist because of problems. Like the problems that they attempt to address, 
policies and the theories which underpin them can be quite varied in their nature. The policy 
literature has effectively been split into a series of branches, each of which attempts to explain 
various parts of the policy process. For example, academics have covered the initial issues, how 
they come to appear on the radar of decision-makers, the development of policies meant to 
address these issues, the evaluation of policies, and the spread of policies, among other aspects. 
However, when it comes to the origin of policies - that first idea, its institutional and operational 
prompt – the literature is lacking. Somewhere along the line, a policy existed for the first time. It 
was invented, with or without intention. Existing policies are now under perpetual revision by 
academics and decision-makers alike, who are now searching for new ways to solve both new 
and old problems. In order to be effective in addressing a policy’s challenges and limitations, we 
must first understand how and why it was created, and its theoretical and practical foundations.  
If we can identify the original form or source idea of a specific policy, we will be better able to 
recognize the traces of that source idea in later iterations of that policy. That recognition not only 
allows us to better understand the specific impetus to a policy’s invention, but also provides the 
opportunity to identify and explore the potential impact of any contextual elements (for example, 
the social norms of the time period, any relevant political factors, et cetera). This concept of 
policy invention and diffusion is what I delve into in this thesis, via an examination of the 
innovation of the product-based approach to regulation of agricultural products of biotechnology, 
and its subsequent diffusion into the Canadian regulatory system for plants with novel traits 
(PNTs). 
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Issues with Canada’s current regulatory landscape for agricultural biotechnology trace 
back to the late 1960s and early 1970s, when research into deoxyribonucleic acid by a barrage of 
scientists reached a climax, leading to the development of recombinant DNA (rDNA) 
technology. This technology was applied to the world of agriculture in the 1970s, largely as a 
response to a perceived crisis in food shortages (Crisp 1974). The ‘novelty’ of the technology 
and its products, defined both in the context of new phenotypical traits that were introduced and 
the degree of familiarity in the global agri-food system, forced potential adopter countries to 
form regulations to address the potential for any associated risk factors in terms of food and 
environmental safety. However, these regulations and the policies that underscored them were 
not uniform across the countries involved. Countries generally followed one of two approaches, 
regulating based on either the product or the process. The product-based approach holds the 
characteristics of novel products to be most important, while the process-based approach 
considers the methods used to create them to be paramount.  There are variations within each 
approach; Canada’s unique approach to product-based regulatory policy is one of them. 
In Canada, agricultural products of biotechnology fall under a category termed “plants 
with novel traits”. Essentially, all novel crops, regardless of the method used to produce them, 
must go through a lengthy scientific risk assessment process, as mandated in the Canadian Food 
Inspection Agency’s Directive 94-08, “Assessment Criteria For Evaluating the Environmental 
Safety of Plants with Novel Traits” (Plant Biosafety Office 1994) and Health Canada’s 
“Guidelines for the Safety Assessment of Novel Foods” (Health Canada 1994).  This is not the 
case in other parts of the world. Even Australia and the United States, nations with which Canada 
shares a unique colonial heritage and comparable socioeconomic conditions, differ in their 
interpretations of agricultural biotechnology regulatory policy.  
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The economic consequences of Canada’s unique approach to regulating agricultural 
products of biotechnology are difficult to quantify. Requiring a series of expensive and time-
consuming risk assessment procedures for the release of a crop into Canada, when a similar 
process is not triggered in other countries such as the United States, places Canada at a 
competitive disadvantage in terms of investment and trade (Ag West Bio 2007). The trade-
related consequences of Canada’s position and the product-versus-process regulatory debate are 
acknowledged but not discussed at length in this paper. 
To determine the implications of Canada’s regulatory position, especially vis-à-vis major 
trading partners like the USA and Europe, it is necessary to first understand how Canada 
developed its policy. This will be examined in the context of policy diffusion. First, I review the 
policy diffusion, policy innovation, and innovation literature. Then, I use the historical method to 
trace in reverse the diffusion of Canada’s policy and determine its source. After this, I apply 
innovation diffusion theory and policy diffusion models to my diffusion pathway in order to 
reach further conclusions and offer guidance with respect to agricultural biotechnology 
regulation and associated policies.  The theories and methods used for the analysis of policy and 
innovation diffusion will also be tested in this thesis in order to examine their usefulness and 
applicability to an ex-post diffusion study for which information constraints are an issue. 
The basic policy process itself is fairly straightforward. Generally, it begins with an 
unmet need in a certain area. Next, policymakers develop a policy in an attempt to address that 
issue, and implement it. Finally, assessments are made, evaluations performed, and policies are 
either kept or replaced. What this simplification leaves out however, is a space to ask the real 
questions: how are these policies initially developed? Where do they come from? Importantly, 
who are the policymakers, really?  
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According to Bradford (1998), policies begin with the introduction of ideas or 
propagating events. Ideas frame the issues that get set onto the policy agenda. They are broad 
tools with which to engage policy reform. They guide the process, and in doing so influence the 
underlying assumptions of a policy area undergoing change (Beland 2009). However, ideas alone 
are not the sole drivers of change. Ideas are abstract concepts, but they come from very concrete 
sources: individuals, organizations, and governments. 
It is possible at any given time to recognize the traces of one source idea in the policies in 
several different jurisdictions. The interpretations of a single idea in multiple states or institutions 
may be as varied as the polities themselves. Scholars of policy diffusion and policy learning have 
spent decades attempting to codify and predict how one idea becomes involved in many different 
places. 
The spread of ideas can be understood through the lens of policy learning. It is unusual 
for there to be problems which are dissimilar entirely from those in other countries or states; as a 
result, the simplest way to develop new policies is to look outside the jurisdiction to see what 
others have done in similar situations. Simply put, governments learn from one another’s 
policies. This is referred to as lesson-drawing (Rose 1991). If one government has a problem and 
develops an effective policy, another government may adapt that policy to the specifics of their 
jurisdiction. If a state has had a policy which has failed, other actors learn what to avoid. Rose 
(1991) argues that policymakers seek experienced or lived policies because they reflect 
feasibility. This is important; according to Meltsner (1972), a proponent of political feasibility 
analysis, it can at times be quite difficult to integrate political considerations into the analysis of 
policy options. Policy learning and lesson drawing can be integral parts of gaining an 
understanding of how realistic a policy may be if adopted elsewhere. However, what happens 
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when a situation arises for which there is no precedent? With all of the policy transfer and 
lessons being drawn, how does the initial policy innovation itself develop? 
Such were the questions around how to manage the introduction of new genetic 
modification techniques into food in the latter half of the twentieth century. If we can understand 
the genesis of the policies in Canada governing GM products, it provides an opportunity to ask a 
follow-up question: are they still relevant?  
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I. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature surrounding diffusion dates back centuries to epidemiological studies 
regarding large outbreaks of disease, like the 1854 London cholera outbreak, which English 
physician John Snow famously traced back to an infected water pump (Cameron and Jones 
1983). Over the years it has evolved to a discussion of innovation and of inventions, to which the 
theories of diffusion have been effectively applied. Innovation theory and diffusion theory have 
evolved to complement each other well, inspiring further academic work in the area of 
innovation diffusion (Rogers 2003, for example). Since the 1960s, there has also been a branch 
of the literature which is dedicated to the diffusion of government policies and programs. It is in 
this application that the innovation diffusion literature is lagging. 
While the bulk of the case studies in the policy diffusion literature are related specifically 
to the United States, there are subsections which attempt to address diffusion and change more 
broadly. A prime example is the development of sometimes nebulous classifications of policy 
change in an effort to establish the degree, order or magnitude of change. This literature 
theorizes about the extent of change, and where the policy change sits in terms of its potential to 
alter world situations and generate new paradigms. Both Hall (1993) and Rose (1993) have 
created typologies to assess the impact of change and to distinguish between policies based on 
how much they vary in form as they diffuse. For example, Hall’s ‘first-order change’ is one in 
which the settings of a policy may be altered because of new information or experiences, but all 
of the goals remain as they were, like in a budget. ‘Second-order change’ is where both policy 
settings and strategies to achieve policy goals are retooled, but the goals themselves are not 
reprioritized. By contrast, ‘third-order change’ involves an overhaul of the system, with policy 
settings, strategies and goals all being changed. Third-order change can be viewed as a total 
paradigm shift. The example commonly cited for third order change is the replacement of the 
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Keynesian macroeconomic policy with a monetarist and supply-side microeconomic approach 
beginning in the late 1970s (Hall 1993).  
Richard Rose (1993) assessed the extent to which a policy is altered when diffusion 
occurs. He defined four degrees of transfer: copying, which is effectively replicating the policy; 
emulation, where the basic ideas underpinning the policy are diffused; combinations, or mixing 
two or more policies; and inspiration, whereupon a policy in one polity may prompt a policy 
change in another, without transferring any of the aspects of the original policy. This typology 
has been applied throughout the literature and has been adopted into similar frameworks (i.e., 
Shipan and Volden 2008). 
Some have created typologies of research approaches themselves. Haas categorized 
policy change as being understood through one of four main lenses: with regard to epistemic 
communities, neorealism, dependency theory, or post-structuralism (Haas 1992). For each lens, 
his typology offers a corresponding level of analysis, area of study, and set of factors that are 
catalytic to policy change. The mechanisms and results of change, as well as the primary actors 
for each approach, are also detailed as seen in Table 1 below. 
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Table 1: Haas’s Typology of Policy Change Approaches 
Approach Level of analysis; area 
of study 
Factors that influence policy 
change 
Mechanisms of change; 
effects  
Primary actors 
Epistemic 
communities 
Transnational; state 
administrators and 
international institutions 
Knowledge; causal and 
principled beliefs 
Diffusion of information 
and learning; shifts in the 
patterns of decision 
making 
Epistemic 
communities; 
individual states 
Neorealist International; states in 
political and economic 
systems 
Distribution of capabilities; 
distribution of costs and 
benefits from actions 
Technological change 
and war; shifts in the 
available power 
resources of states and in 
the nature of the game 
States 
Dependency 
theorist 
International; global 
systems 
Comparative advantage of 
states in the global division of 
labour; control over economic 
resources 
Changes in production; 
shifts in the location of 
the states in the global 
division of labour 
States in the core, 
periphery, and semi-
periphery; 
multinational 
corporations 
Poststructuralist International; discourse 
and language 
Usage and meanings of words Discourse; the opening of 
new political spaces and 
opportunities 
Unclear  
Taken from Haas (1992), pg. 22. 
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Those who consider the role of epistemic communities in widespread policy change 
pinpoint groups of experts, as well as states, as being the primary actors in the change process. 
Taking the perspective of neorealists, states act to change policy as a result of the changing 
distribution of capabilities, using technological change and war. Dependency theorists likewise 
see states as the primary actors; however, states are identified as being part of the core, the 
periphery, or the semi-periphery. Policy change occurs because of the status of some states vis-à-
vis others, where these states utilize changes in production as a mechanism to project their 
interests. The post-structuralist approach to understanding policy change is also focused on an 
international level, with major actors not clearly identified. Post-structuralism sees policy change 
as occurring via discourse and the freeing of political spaces, considering it the result of the 
changing use of words and their meanings. Knowledge, principles and information drive change, 
which occurs via information-sharing and the diffusion of knowledge through epistemic 
networks (Haas 1992). 
There has also been work done on the ability of actors to affect change in policies that are 
meant to address complex issues.  For example, Bernstein and Cashore (2012) created a typology 
of four pathways that international actors could follow in order to influence domestic policies, 
using the specific example of forest governance and other complex environmental problems.  
The first pathway is via international rules, such as the influence of treaties or international 
organizations (such as the World Trade Organization).  Domestic policies are likely to be 
affected because nations are bound (in some cases) by organizations’ charters or by their treaty 
obligations.  The second pathway is through international norms and discourse, which usually 
find their roots in international organizations and fora.  Norms and discourse can affect what type 
of domestic behaviour may be considered appropriate, and responsiveness to the external 
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pressure that the international community may enforce can be reputationally significant.  The 
third pathway involves controlling markets (to the extent possible) in order to drive domestic 
changes.  Economic sanctions and like mechanisms can be used to push policies in a particular 
direction.  The fourth pathway of influence is for actors to have direct access to domestic 
policymaking, which may include provision of assistance (whether financial or otherwise) to 
existing domestic groups that are working toward a specific policy outcome (Bernstein & 
Cashore 2012).  Each of these provides an opportunity for actors who are not traditionally part of 
a nation’s domestic policy structure to be able to assert their influence and assist in policy 
change, whether it be through diffusion of innovative ideas or the transfer of existing policies 
from one area to another. 
Since the 1990s, there have been further contributions to the transfer literature which 
have attempted to qualify transfer and offer typologies to better understand it. Shipan and Volden 
(2008) offer four instruments of policy diffusion that have been partly derived from Rose’s 
(1993) degrees of transfer: learning, which they say has positive results when based on effective 
policies; imitating, which could be unsuitable for the adopting polity; competition, which 
produces negative externalities and generally bad results; and coercion, leading to policies which 
are generally ineffective in the receptor system. The authors constructed seven models to test 
several hypotheses that they proposed about the behaviour of large and small cities in American 
states with respect to each of these mechanisms. Their results showed that while large and small 
cities had equal capacity to be influenced via coercion by the state government, large cities were 
less likely to engage in strict imitation of one another’s policies, less likely to have an aversion to 
economic competition, and more likely to learn from the innovative policy experiences of their 
peers.  
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Scholars of diffusion and transfer have also undertaken studies which aim to test specific 
determinants of diffusion. For example, Grossback et al (2004) utilized the data from three prior 
studies of diffusion, including Berry and Berry’s (1990) study of state lottery adoptions, and 
added in a variable to represent ideology in an effort to ascertain whether it played a role. They 
found that ideology was the only measure which was significant in all of the three cases. 
Similarly, Ka and Teske (2002) ran a regression model to test for ideology in the regulation and 
deregulation of electricity in American states, showing that in more liberal states, electricity rate 
structures tend to favour residential consumers.  
In the context of this, it is relevant to acknowledge the existence of a body of literature 
which explains policy change via behavioural economic theory. It begins with Simon’s (1955) 
articulation of rational choice, whereby a rational actor will (after setting goals and identifying 
alternatives) choose an option which allows him to receive the largest payoff. The literature 
continues with the concept of incrementalism, best attributed to Lindblom (1959), wherein 
change occurs as the result of a series of smaller decisions – what he calls “muddling through” – 
rather than in a large step. Following this, Baumgartner and Jones (1993) introduced the idea of 
punctuated equilibrium into social science theory as an alternative to incrementalism and 
associated theories that followed, such as garbage can theory (Cohen et al 1972). Punctuated 
equilibrium suggests that the status quo is generally maintained in a society, except for sudden, 
radical shifts where change occurs quickly. This literature has also been challenged by Stone, 
who contends that rational models of economic choice are limited in the real world (2002). Stone 
also contends that the causal story of a policy issue, or the way that a problem is viewed, impacts 
upon the process of policy change and decision making (1989). Further discussion of the 
behavioural decision-making literature is out of the scope of this thesis, but must be 
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acknowledged as it contributes to the broader understanding of policy change across 
jurisdictions. 
Other attempts to classify the process of policy diffusion involve cataloguing the types of 
transfer in an attempt to identify the degree of volunteerism involved. Dolowitz and Marsh 
(2000), for example, constructed a continuum with lesson drawing based on the assumption of 
perfect rationality at one end and coercive transfer via direct imposition at the other. In between 
are varying conditions, such as lesson drawing under bounded rationality, voluntary transfer with 
perceived necessity, obligated transfer, and conditionality, as seen in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Dolowitz and Marsh’s Transfer Continuum 
 
 The state to the furthest left on the continuum involves voluntary lesson drawing under 
the assumption of perfect rationality. As this is unrealistic in a real-world scenario where actors 
are susceptible to their own cognitive limitations and to the influence of external stimuli, lesson 
drawing under the assumption of bounded rationality is more likely. This theoretically could 
include all voluntary lesson drawing which is independent of outside pressure. The more that 
external influence exists in a policy transfer decision, the further right on the continuum that 
situation would be. For example, if a country adopts a policy with the main motive being to 
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make a favourable impression on the rest of the global community, then it would fall best under 
the transfer state responding “voluntarily but driven by perceived necessity”. This is different 
from obligated transfer, which occurs because of some type of deal or treaty among nations. 
Conditionality is another state which lies further still along the continuum, just to the left of a 
directly imposed transfer via coercion. Conditionality is often seen in the transfer of ideologies 
via political parties but also includes policies transferred as a result of loan programs such as the 
International Monetary Fund’s structural adjustment programs, where money is lent to poor 
nations with the provision that certain economic and democratic criteria be met. 
Scholars of policy diffusion have also recently begun to involve cognition and heuristics 
in their analyses, seeking to identify the role that the decision-making tools and practices play in 
permitting policy change. Weyland (2005) employed heuristics in his study of pension reform in 
Latin America, using (among others) the availability heuristic to contribute to an understanding 
of the initial regional diffusion of a reform first undertaken by Chile. The availability heuristic, 
whereby the examples that can be immediately called to mind are assigned greater importance 
simply by the virtue of their mental availability, explains why Chile’s pension reform spread 
more easily to neighbouring Latin American countries than did other potential alternatives which 
were not implemented within geographic proximity to adopter nations. Weyland also considered 
heuristics as part of his exploration of institutional change in political regimes in developmental 
and welfare states (2008). He again utilized the availability heuristic and representativeness 
heuristic, the latter of which refers to actors interpreting the similarity, or representativeness, of 
an event to mean that the probability of occurrence or success in other jurisdictions is high, to 
explain the cognitive biases inherent in diffusion processes. Heuristics are useful with respect to 
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the decision-making aspects of policy change and transfer, but do not improve the predictive 
power of diffusion models. 
There have also been strong contributions made to the innovation literature with regard to 
diffusion that can be borrowed and applied generally to policy. Rogers (2003) defined diffusion 
of innovations by breaking it down into what he has identified as four main elements: the 
innovation itself, the means of communication, time, and the network or system through which 
the innovation seeks to diffuse. The innovation itself may be a physical object like a DVD 
player, a non-physical entity like the Internet, or in this case, a policy. The means of 
communication includes word of mouth, and in a policy case may involve actors such as 
professional associations or other networks of experts. 
Scholars of the diffusion process are best able to represent the role of time via the 
creation of diffusion curves. The cumulative number of adopters can be represented by an S 
curve. A normal S curve begins slowly, with a few early adopters; it then steadily grows until a 
midpoint at which half of the potential adopters have done so. The curve rises more slowly after 
that, as the number of actors who could adopt decreases (see Figure 2). 
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Figure 2: The Innovation Diffusion S-Curve and Adopter Categories (Rogers 2003, adapted) 
 
 The S-curve is useful in explaining the effect of networks in the diffusion process. In the 
beginning, early adopters spread the word of the innovation throughout the system. As more 
actors adopt, more interpersonal networks are engaged, and eventually a point is reached where 
more actors have adopted than have not (Rogers 2003). 
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Similar to the S-curve, the bell curve plots adoption over a time variable. Unlike the S 
curve, the bell curve is not cumulative, which allows for a researcher to impose a set of adopter 
categories. These are groupings of actors put together based on the relative proximity of the time 
that they adopted the innovation. Categories are set up by determining the mean ( ) and the 
standard deviation (sd) of the independent variable, time (t). Rogers (2003) has produced a useful 
and seminal set of general categories, as seen in Figure 2. 
The first group of adopters can be found to the left of  - 2sd and, as the first 2.5 per cent 
of adopters, are called “the innovators”. The next 13.5 per cent of adopters, between  - 2sd and 
 - sd, are “early adopters”. Those who fall in the area between  - sd and  are part of the 
“early majority” of 34 per cent. The analogous area to the right of  is made up of the “late 
majority”. To their right, at  + sd and onward, are a final group known as “the laggards”, equal 
to 16 per cent of actors. 
There are limitations to diffusion curves. Both the S curve and the bell curve are not as 
useful for studying innovations whose diffusions were incomplete, failed or inexhaustive. Those 
who did not adopt would fit neither on a bell curve nor an S curve for diffusion and thus would 
not be captured by this methodology.  
Still, adopter categories like those illustrated by Rogers (2003) can offer a profile of 
actors who should have ideally adopted next. From that, it may be sometimes possible to 
extrapolate information regarding why an innovation did not diffuse. For example, in consumer 
theory, early adopters are more likely to be literate and have more years of education than those 
who adopt later. They are also likely to be socioeconomically better off, more flexible with their 
belief systems, more rational, and more capable of managing risk and uncertainty (Rogers 2003). 
Analogies can be found among states and governments for these categories. 
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There are five aspects of innovations which can largely explain varying rates of adoption: 
relative advantage, compatibility, complexity, trialability, and observability (Rogers 2003). 
Relative advantage is simply the idea that an innovation is superior to whatever it is replacing. 
Success in adoption also depends on how compatible the innovation is with those who may 
adopt, their values and needs. A possible hindrance to successful diffusion of innovations is if a 
new product or idea is too complex to understand. Those innovations which are simpler are more 
likely to be adopted. The fourth characteristic is trialability, or the possibility to test out a new 
innovation without needing full adoption. The concept of trialability can be seen in the 
implementation of pilot programs for new policies. According to Sanderson (2002), evaluations 
for pilot programs attempt to address two questions: whether the innovation worked, and how it 
can be improved. The final characteristic is observability, which is the ability of potential 
adopters to observe the experiences of an earlier adopter. If an actor or state is able to engage in 
trial use of an innovation or watch a peer utilize the innovation, they are more likely to adopt it 
(Rogers 2003). 
Where the literature is lacking is in the area of policy innovation and invention. Theories 
and typologies abound as to how a policy finds its way into different jurisdictions, and 
acknowledgement is given that third-order-type change (Hall 1993) exists, but not much 
attention has been paid to the actual processes of invention and innovation specifically for the 
policy realm. Of course, most policy change is incremental, but at some point in any policy’s 
history, a pioneering polity adapted and adopted it from its inventors. Effort must be made to 
clarify that there is a difference between policy innovation and policy invention – policy 
innovation may be considered new to any state that adopts it, while policy invention is new 
everywhere (Berry & Berry 1999). The problem with defining policy innovation as anything new 
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to a state, as Mintrom (1997) does, is that the initial action is subsequently ignored and is thus 
left under-theorized. Bradford (1998), when discussing the innovation process in policy, claims 
that literature should explain where and how policy is developed in new areas, but makes little 
effort to do so. While there is little in this area, it is important to view this identification as an 
opportunity and not a constraint. 
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II. METHODS 
Within the policy diffusion literature, approaches to testing hypotheses are limited to a 
few major methodologies. Among the first published studies of diffusion to involve statistics was 
Walker (1969). The study sought answers to two questions: first, why some American states 
more quickly implemented new programs than did others, and second, how these programs or 
policies dispersed across the country from their initial pioneering states. After conducting some 
limited statistical analysis, he concluded that as more states adopted a policy, the quicker 
remaining states would be to also adopt, particularly if one of the states in question was 
perceived to be like-minded, or “a point of legitimate comparison” (Walker 1969, p. 897). 
Initially, most quantitative diffusion methods involved common statistics, including cross-
sectional analyses with regression (i.e. Gray 1973). Even as authors utilized this method in their 
studies, they acknowledged its limitations. While it has been incorporated largely into another 
method known as event history analysis, statistical regression models are still sometimes used 
(Ka & Teske 2002, first analysis).  
Event history analysis is the method which is most popular with studies of policy 
diffusion among the American states, which dominate in the diffusion literature. Event history 
analysis lends itself well to the study of American states because of their identical structure, the 
large number of units of analysis, and the relative availability of data. It seeks to analyze a policy 
change, which is called “the event”, as it transpired in an actor at a given time. The data 
involved, known as the “event history”, is built into either a discrete time model or a continuous 
time model. A discrete time model involves a set of units for a prescribed time frame, while a 
continuous time model assumes the event occurs at one point in time. The models include the 
risk set, which is comprised of the states at risk of adopting a certain policy. It may decrease over 
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time if the event is unrepeatable. The ‘hazard’ rate (Pi,t) is the variable that must be explained: it 
is the likelihood (P) that a state (i) will adopt the policy in a given time parameter (t). As a 
probability, the hazard rate is an unobserved variable and thus a dummy variable must be used 
for statistical analysis.  
There are several strengths to the event history analysis method. The likelihood of 
claiming a spurious relationship to be causal is reduced, since theoretically other causal effects 
can be controlled for. Event history analysis incorporates longitudinal data with variation, so 
slight differences from year to year will be included in the assessment of the hazard rate. 
Importantly, unlike in statistical models using cross-sectional data, event history analysis 
accounts for time frames. As a result, when socioeconomic characteristics change, they are 
related appropriately to the time-dependent variable. Berry and Berry (1990) championed this 
method in an early study of state lottery adoptions, and since then it has become the preeminent 
method of diffusion analysis for scholars working with the American states (Balla 2001; Berry & 
Berry 1992, 1999; Ka & Teske 2002; Mintrom 1997; Shipan & Volden 2008). 
 There is a small subsection of the literature that involves diffusion within a polity. In such 
cases, diffusion is usually tested with a non-quantified model, such as in Mintrom & Vergari’s 
(1996) comparison of policy entrepreneurship and advocacy coalition models with regard to 
education reform in Michigan. The advocacy coalition framework has a longer time frame best 
suited to incremental policy learning. It involves tracing groups of cross-institutional policy 
actors with similar perspectives, known as policy coalitions (Sabatier 1988). The policy 
entrepreneurship model, by contrast, operates within a short period of time and involves altering 
the status quo in a major way. The model focuses on the involvement of policy entrepreneurs, 
actors within the policy system who have managed to gain influence with or without elected 
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authority. The two models are not mutually exclusive and may rather be viewed, according to 
Mintrom & Vergari, like two different types of maps. 
 The vast majority of case studies are those which involve state-to-state diffusion of 
policies or programs. Of these, event history analysis is the predominant methodology used. It 
and its predecessor, cross-sectional statistical regression models, are the major quantitative 
research methods within the policy diffusion literature. The policy entrepreneurship model, the 
advocacy coalition framework, and the historical method lead the qualitative research methods in 
the literature. The dominance of quantitative methodologies – and the large focus on American 
states in diffusion studies – leaves open an opportunity for further research and method 
formulation in the qualitative realm. 
The diffusion literature also utilizes a qualitative technique called the historical method. 
Common throughout the social sciences, scholars who pursue the historical method use primary 
sources and historical record to trace an event. Carpenter (2001) used the historical method to 
analyze patterns of policy innovation in the USA, particularly with regard to the bureaucratic 
autonomy of the U.S. Postal Service, USDA, and the Department of the Interior. In the policy 
realm, the historical method means that building a narrative relies on news, government 
documents, and published academic articles as primary sources. Kraemer et al (1992) tracked the 
diffusion of computing technology through Asia-Pacific nations and were unable to attain the 
type of data that could prove causality, although their historical narrative shows a clear 
relationship between levels of development and investment in computing vis-à-vis government 
policies of intervention or non-intervention. 
In the context of the theories and methods discussed here, I will be employing the 
historical method to identify the root of the PNT category within Canada’s regulatory system for 
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agricultural products of biotechnology. Given that the PNT category is unique, it both warrants 
further study and helps to narrow and focus the analysis. Testing drivers of diffusion theory, like 
in methods such as event history analysis, is difficult in a situation with international scope 
because of insufficient data. In practice, innovation and diffusion theory are applied most often 
to innovations that are widely diffused and adopted. This puts a bias on understanding successful 
diffusion. In this case, we are looking at the creation of a new policy, the PNT trigger, which was 
promoted by Canada and some international scientific partners as a good policy for global use, 
but has not diffused beyond Canada. Where diffusion theory helps, in this case, is in identifying 
first the sources and flows of some of the underlying concepts and second in understanding why 
it failed to be taken up more broadly. The historical method provides an unquantified alternative. 
My narrative begins with the roots of Canada’s regulations in the initial movements with rDNA 
technology in the 1970s. It then follows the history of the technology’s regulation, from 
recommendations in the international sphere to the development and implementation of Canada’s 
domestic regulations. The case that follows is bounded by a few choices:  the focus on PNT as 
the regulatory trigger generally defines the forums where there were discussions, the actors who 
were engaged and the period under review.  The next chapters chronicle the events, outline the 
key events and documents that drove the policy effort, signalled the key actors and organizations 
and their activities.  As already noted, this analysis focuses on the explicit choice in Canada of 
the PNT trigger and not on the process that delivered the dichotomy of product versus process 
regulatory approaches that characterizes the global regulatory system for GM foods. 
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III. CASE STUDY: Development of Agricultural Biotechnology Regulation in Canada 
Tracing the Steps of Novelty 
Traditional plant breeding has gone on since the advent of agriculture millennia ago. 
Technological development in agriculture has moved in discrete step adjustments. The 
emergence of planned seed selection and forced crossing techniques in the last half of the 1800s 
generated significant innovation of seeds—the opening of Western Canada, for instance, was at 
least partly due to the development of faster maturing wheat varieties (Fedak 2013). In the 1930s 
the development of hybridization radically altered the agroeconomy, with corn becoming the 
anchor to a major part of the global food and feed industry (Griliches 1957). In the 1960s the 
development of dwarf varieties of wheat and rice precipitated the Green Revolution (Evanson & 
Gollin 2003).  All of these techniques simply worked to reorder the genetic materials in the 
target crops. With the discovery of rDNA in the 1970s, that limitation was removed and now the 
only constraint was imagination.  
Recombinant DNA technology facilitates the creation of DNA molecules that would not 
be naturally found in organisms, via the combination of genes extracted from the DNA of two or 
more different organisms (Griffiths et al. 2000). Since its discovery, rDNA technology has been 
applied in many areas, notably medicine and agriculture. Scientists have used rDNA technology 
to make old drugs in new ways, such as recombinant insulin, new drugs, such as various gene 
therapies, and a wide range of crops with special traits, such as herbicide-resistant canola, insect 
resistant corn and viral resistant papaya . Before rDNA, the isolation of single genes or groups of 
genes was virtually impossible. The idea of being able to combine genes to create unique DNA 
sequences (and subsequently organisms) offered great promise. As Dr. Paul Berg, one of the 
pioneers of rDNA technology, described: 
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"The overwhelming body of scientists view the recombinant DNA methodology 
as an extraordinary opportunity to solve important biological problems; the 
knowledge gained will illuminate our biologic nature and heritage; and very 
likely, help to alleviate the tragedies of human disease, starvation, and the 
pollution of our environment" (Testimony by Paul Berg, 1977, p.2). 
Recombinant DNA technology began to be applied to agriculture largely because of the 
global food crisis in the 1970s, during which food insecurity had reached a crucial point. 
Because of a rapidly expanding population (Crisp 1974), the conventional Malthusian wisdom 
was that the ability of agriculturally-viable areas of the world to meet food needs was or would 
soon be outpaced by population growth. This combined with what Dyer calls a “crisis of mass 
consumption” (1998, p.105), caused by the global recession and 1970s Russian Wheat Deal.1 It 
led to a push for finding innovative solutions for pressing issues, including stress on animal food 
sources. Plant protein was sought as an alternative, and experimentation with agricultural 
technology and biotechnology began. 
 The development of biotechnology centered, as does much novel technology, on an 
epistemic community. An epistemic community can be defined as a “network of professionals 
with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain” (Haas 1992, p.3). In 1972, the 
United Nations University’s Protein Advisory Group released laboratory safety guidelines to be 
followed when utilizing the new technology (Jonas 2000).
2
 Their interpretation of ‘novel 
sources’ was the first to incorporate specific connotations of unfamiliarity in this context; from 
this point on, “novel” would no longer simply mean newness, but would indicate something 
unknown, thereby necessitating the application of a risk management structure.  
                                                          
1
 The Russian Wheat Deal is sometimes also referred to as the "Great grain robbery". It refers to the Soviet purchase 
of American wheat at prices that had been subsidized, which had the effect of increasing domestic prices for wheat 
in the US (Luttrell 1973). 
2
 The guidelines were titled “Preclinical Testing of Novel Sources of Protein” and would later be updated and 
rereleased as PAG/UNU 1983. 
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It was around this time that the Risk Analysis Framework was developed. First iterated in 
1983 in the National Academy of Science’s “Redbook,” the RAF is a methodological approach 
to managing technological innovation and is now embedded within policy systems of most 
OECD states. The RAF has three main functions: risk assessment, risk management, and risk 
communication. It is logical and science-based: the risk assessment portion involves looking at 
the relative short-term safety effects and long-term health effects of a product, ignoring 
socioeconomic factors. Some scholars have claimed that there are substantive problems with 
relying on this method of risk analysis for assessing the safety of products derived from 
agricultural biotechnology: accountability and transparency in the regulatory process are 
threatened by technical jargon; in addition, the concept of ‘sound science’ is problematic (Isaac 
2006). Furthermore, the RAF’s end-stage of risk communication may now often be considered a 
first step for the scope definition of a risk assessment process (Phillips 2009). Nevertheless, its 
blend of rationality and caution aims to ensure that no product is overregulated or under-
regulated.  
The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) presents an interesting parallel to the 
RAF. Signed in 1992 and operationalized in 1993, the CBD is a multilateral treaty that 
introduces and enshrines (among other things) the precautionary principle. While the RAF sets 
out a logical pathway for risk assessment undertaken by a potential adopter, the precautionary 
principle shifts the uncertainty surrounding risk onto the proponent of a new technology. 
Originally part of the Rio Declaration at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 
(incorporated into the Preamble of the CBD), the precautionary principle states that “where there 
is a threat of significant reduction or loss of biological diversity, lack of full scientific certainty 
should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to avoid or minimize such a threat” 
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(CBD 1992, preamble). Since then, the scope of the precautionary principle has broadened past 
simple biological diversity to include other environmental concerns and beyond. It has been 
embedded within the domestic policies of European Union countries and others, used in part to 
restrict products derived from controversial or novel processes and technologies such as 
recombinant DNA. 
In 1973, researchers held the Gordon Research Conference on Nucleic Acids to discuss 
recent research and movements with respect to DNA technology, as well as safety concerns.  
Afterward, the attendees published a letter in Science calling for a committee to assess potential 
risks and hazards associated with the technology (Singer & Soll 1973). Such a committee was 
convened, comprised of ten scientists: Paul Berg of Stanford University, the chairman of the 
committee; David Baltimore of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Richard Roblin of 
Harvard Medical School; Stanley N. Cohen of Stanford University; Ronald W. Davis of Stanford 
University; David S. Hogness of Stanford University; Daniel Nathans of Johns Hopkins 
University; James Watson of Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory; Sherman Weissman of Yale 
University; and Norton D. Zinder of the Rockefeller University. They released the ‘Berg letter’ 
in 1974, which called for a moratorium on rDNA experiments until safety assessments could be 
conducted (Berg et al. 1974). In an unprecedented move, the scientific community agreed. On 
November 2, 1977, Dr. Paul Berg testified to the U.S. Senate’s Subcommittee on Science, 
Technology and Space; he revealed that years of hazard testing and risk assessment had led him 
and colleagues to withdraw their earlier concerns about potential harms of rDNA technology, 
stating that overregulation of the technology “could stultify the creativity and initiative that has 
characterized the recombinant DNA technique” (Testimony by Paul Berg, 1977, p.6). 
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The following year, the 1975 Conference on Recombinant DNA Molecules was held in 
Asilomar, CA. Perhaps more famously known simply as the Asilomar Conference, it resulted in 
a set of guidelines for laboratory practices involving rDNA experiments. It was attended by over 
a hundred scientists, government representatives and journalists from around the world, 
including all of the ten signatories to the Berg letter. Its summary statement (Berg et al. 1975) 
includes references to products of rDNA technology, forthcoming biotypes, and associated risk. 
This focus on the new processes of biotechnology would be the dominant pattern for the next 
decade, with most of the concentration on laboratory work without any kind of commercial 
release.  
By the early 1980s, it was obvious that the new biotechnologies were not going to be 
limited to the laboratory permanently and that regulatory systems for commercial release would 
need to be developed. International organizations like the Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) took the lead, 
gathering panels of experts from the epistemic community surrounding agricultural 
biotechnology to make assessments on potential structuring elements for regulatory systems. The 
OECD initially released a report (Bull et al. 1982) with regard to the new technology, claiming 
agreement with a Dutch report from the year prior (van Apeldoorn 1981) in which the authors 
recommended a process-based regulatory approach.  
Meanwhile, first-mover countries began to get organized as well. In 1983, the United 
States Environmental Protection Agency began regulating microbial GMOs under the Toxic 
Substances Control Act. Its focus on novel effects and the like complimented the existing 
pressure at the time to make regulatory decisions with the influence of scientific evidence alone 
(Levidow & Carr 2000). The White House’s Office of Science and Technology Policy 
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subsequently released its proposal for a Coordinated Framework for Regulation of 
Biotechnology, which included the concept of product-based regulation, or evaluating products 
based on their characteristics as opposed to their method of production. Two years later, they 
released the completed Framework. It emphasized the need for inter-agency cooperation in US 
regulation because of the broad characteristics of biotechnology. It also specifically outlined that 
“the manufacture of new technologies … will be reviewed by FDA, USDA and EPA in 
essentially the same manner and efficacy as products obtained by other techniques” (Office of 
Science and Technology Policy 1986, p.7), but also left open the opportunity for those agencies 
to monitor the technological landscape for potential future implications.  
One of the pivotal moments for the product-based approach came in 1986. The OECD 
released its completed 1986 document, Recombinant DNA Safety Considerations. In it they 
backtrack
3
 on their earlier (Bull et al. 1982) assertions of the process approach, indicating that 
“risks associated with applications of rDNA organisms may be assessed in generally the same 
way as those associated with non-rDNA organisms” (OECD 1986, p. 30). Also at this time, the 
FAO and World Health Organization began joint consultations on assessments specifically 
related to foods produced via biotechnology, the reports from which give no indication that there 
is justification for separate regulatory systems based on process (World Health Organization 
1991). International organizations, drawing expert advice from the global agricultural 
biotechnology epistemic community, including university professors and researchers, public 
                                                          
3
 The Group of Government Experts responsible for the compilation of the report acknowledge the Bull et al. 
(1982) report as one of many “useful reviews” (OECD 1986, p. 16) that have been conducted, but do not give very 
specific reasons as to why the OECD’s position changed. However, it is the nature of consensus in documents 
produced from a collective such as the 1986 report that experts from national bodies will consult with colleagues 
with expertise in the field, particularly in a knowledge-intensive and quickly-changing area such as biotechnology, 
which may have led to the re-evaluation of the technology.  
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scientists and regulators and industry scientists, reached a theoretical consensus on the debate 
between a regulatory system based on the process of alteration and one based on product.  
Although there were many European scientists that took part in the OECD working group 
who produced Recombinant DNA Safety Considerations, European governments at this point 
made a conscious choice to pursue a process-based regulatory system for transgenic crops so that 
they could control their adoption. This is where disconnect between the two main broad 
approaches to regulation finds its roots. The European Economic Community released Directive 
90/220/EEC in 1990. It regulates the release of genetically modified organisms which are 
defined by techniques (elaborated in an annex). Recombinant DNA and cell fusion or 
hybridization “by means of methods that do not occur naturally” are considered to be genetically 
modified, while in vitro fertilization, polyploidy introduction, mutagenesis and “any other natural 
process” like conjugation or transformation are not considered to be genetically modified (EEC 
1990, Annexes 1A, 1B). 
 This directive is reflective of the precautionary principle (CBD 1992), the preventive 
guideline which has come to govern much of European policy with regard to biological 
organisms and the environment. The precautionary principle is just as it sounds: it involves 
restricting activities to which the consequences or effects are unknown in order to protect the 
general populace, with the assumption that the negative results would outweigh any potential 
benefits either to society or the academy (Miller and Conko 2004). Advocates of the 
precautionary approach are not willing to endure risk in order to pursue a post-normal science 
like biotechnology, which calls for stakeholder participation beyond simply those with 
specialized knowledge (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1994). By institutionalizing the precautionary 
principle, Europe has taken a “look before you leap” attitude. From the early 1990s forward, 
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Europe formally adopted a process-based stance on agricultural biotechnology regulation, 
believing that GMOs that result from rDNA technology are more dangerous than organisms 
derived from more conventional methods. 
 The European perspective, novelty of process rather than product, would later be 
reiterated in 1997 with the European Commission’s Novel Food Regulation 258/97. It regulated 
the release and approval of novel food in the European Union in accordance with the definition 
of GMOs provided earlier by the EEC directive on genetic modification (European Commission 
1997).
4
 Meanwhile, the 1991 document from the joint Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations and World Health Organization task force on biotechnology, titled “Strategies for 
assessing the safety of foods produced by biotechnology,” created a definition of biotechnology 
that refers to both GM and conventional breeding practices, meaning to express that there is “no 
fundamental difference between traditional products and contemporary ones obtained by means 
of biotechnology” (WHO 1991, p.3). This infers that the principles of safety and methods of 
assessment should also be the same. The risks regarding safety considerations may exist in 
traditional breeding and not solely in the application of rDNA technology, argues the task force. 
With regard to the FAO/WHO position, the most compelling idea is not the novelty of the 
process, or even of the traits; indeed, it is the concept that there would be no novel risks 
associated with new technologies. Basically, as it applies to risks with rDNA versus conventional 
techniques, novelty does not exist – the risks are the same. These ideas lend more credence to the 
bases of the Canadian regulatory system. 
                                                          
4
 The European perspective, novelty of process rather than product, would later be reiterated in 1997 with the 
European Commission’s Novel Food Regulation, numbered 258/97. It regulated the release and approval of novel 
food in the European Union in accordance with the definition of GMOs provided earlier by the EEC directive on 
genetic modification (European Commission 1997). 
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The concept of product over process was originally enshrined in regulations with respect 
to trade. Article III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which came into 
effect in 1948, introduces the principle of non-discrimination with regard to the treatment of 
imported products vis-à-vis “like products of national origin” (GATT, Article III (4)). The 
interpretation of Article III has been the subject of much debate and litigation, with one version 
being that any approaches to regulating imported goods which are based on anything other than 
the physical attributes of the product should be considered violations of GATT (exceptions in 
Article XX, such as the use of slave labour, notwithstanding). On the other hand, the movement 
for the inclusion of process production methods (PPMs) into GATT holds to an Article III 
interpretation whereby process-based measures are not covered, and are thus not GATT 
violations (Howse & Regan 2000). The PPM movement has been disputed, with one argument 
against it being that this could lead to a “slippery slope” of process-based regulation (Jackson 
2000). 
Complicating things are the TRIPs, SPS and TBT Agreements which came into effect 
alongside the establishment of the World Trade Organization on January 1, 1995, which 
superseded GATT: The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) provides minimum standards for the administration of intellectual property rights, 
which under TRIPS, extend to GMOs. This has been the subject of much debate and controversy, 
notably with respect to the ability of large GM seed giants like Monsanto to seek legal action 
against farmers who use their seed without the proper permissions (Strauss 2009).  
Another agreement also introduced, the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), acknowledges that countries have a right to set protections for 
health with regard to food safety, animal, and plant standards, provided those measures do not 
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create unnecessary restrictions to trade. In order to ban a group of bioproducts such as GM food, 
the SPS Agreement requires that a scientific risk assessment be undertaken; however, paragraph 
7 of Article V provides an exception to that requirement, providing that “in cases where relevant 
scientific evidence is insufficient, a Member may provisionally adopt sanitary or phytosanitary 
measures on the basis of available pertinent information, including that from the relevant 
international organizations as well as from sanitary or phytosanitary measures applied by other 
Members” (WTO 1995b, Article V (7)). This has permitted many European countries to go 
ahead with what is effectively a ban on GM products. The third agreement introduced, the 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), has a similar function to the SPS Agreement 
with regard to testing, certifications, and other technical regulations or standards, and has 
experienced many of the same issues surrounding interpretation with respect to GMOs and 
labelling requirements. The application of novelty in intellectual property is an additional stream 
of the concept but its development had little material effect on novelty in regulation. Much of the 
controversy involving trade-related aspects of the product vs. process debate is out of the scope 
of this case study, but provides important context for the rest of the paper. 
Two years after the OECD and the United States championed a product-based approach, 
Canada began movements toward its own regulatory policy for agricultural biotechnology. The 
Canadian Agri-Food Research Council (CARC) held a workshop entitled “Workshop on the 
Regulation of Agricultural Products of Biotechnology” in 1988, bringing together Canadian 
academics, government and industry representatives, as well as officials from the United States. 
This workshop was the culmination of a decade of Canadian agricultural biotechnology policy 
orientating around promotion and the importance of embracing innovation (Abergel & Barrett 
2002). It was tasked with improving Canadian agricultural biotechnology policy via an 
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examination of the landscape, a comparison with the United States and Europe, and the 
recommendation of regulations for risk assessment. The idea of plants with novel traits, 
conceptually but not by name, was borne at this conference.  
A small number of key actors can be identified via their presence at three events which 
were integral to the development of the product-based regulatory approach. These people may 
have unwillingly or willingly played the role of an agent of change. The 1975 meeting of 
scientists in Asilomar, California, discussed the potential for risks and hazards of biotechnology, 
including concerns about the stability of the new genetic constructs, their potential to be 
invaisive and the possibility that new hazards might be introduced into otherewise safe biological 
activities.  The main result of the event was a call for a temporary mostly voluntary halt to some 
research activities and to commercialization in order to figure out what might be needed in terms 
of  potential regulation. This event had two attendees who also participated in the ad hoc Group 
of Government Experts (GGE) on Safety and Regulations in Biotechnology. OECD GGEs, now 
referred to as “expert advisory groups”, consist of individuals with relevant knowledge and 
expertise who have been nominated for service by their and other member governments (OECD 
2014). The GGE conducted a substantial review of the techniques and products of recombinant 
DNA technology in order to identify criteria that may be used to establish safety in the use of 
recombinant DNA and its products, and were contributors to the 1986 OECD report, 
Recombinant DNA Safety Considerations (see Table 2). Two of the members of the GGE were 
also present at the CARC workshop in Ottawa in 1988. While there are no actors who were 
present for all three events, the summary reports of each of these workshops or working groups, 
as well as subsequent publications and the spread of proceedings via word of mouth through the 
epistemic community are all factors which contributed to the diffusion of policy ideas.  
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After the 1988 CARC workshop, the Government of Canada turned to Dr. Wally 
Beversdorf, (a 1988 CARC workshop attendee, one of the fathers of canola and then the Chair of 
the Department of Crop Science at the University of Guelph, for assistance in developing risk 
assessment and safety guidelines for the wide release of agricultural products of biotechnology. 
Dr. Beversdorf held a series of workshops to develop draft regulations, including a workshop in 
November of 1993, entitled Regulating Agricultural Products of Biotechnology. Its objectives 
were consensus on PNT approaches, regulatory consistency with previously used criteria, 
sharing of information and the development of strong working relationships. There was a stress 
placed on safety over economics, a focus on scientifically-founded risk, and preference toward 
coordination in development of regulations (Smyth 2009).  
The presence of these individuals at multiple events suggests engagement, whether or not 
the spread of information and ideas throughout networks and academic disciplines was 
intentional is undetermined. Table 2 serves to illustrate a potential diffusion pathway for the 
ideas surrounding the regulation of recombinant DNA technology which underlay the novelty 
approach. This pathway is also a representation of the interactivity of the agricultural 
biotechnology epistemic community; the individuals presented are not intended to be specifically 
identified as carriers of policy information, but rather represent institutions and governments. 
Institutions are made of people; people carry ideas, utilizing them in debates and discussions and 
aiding in their diffusion. 
 
 
  
  
 
 
3
5
 
Table 2: Conference Attendees  
Actor 
Asilomar 1975
5
 OECD 1986
6
 CARC 1988
7
 
Ag Canada 1993 
workshops 
158 attendees; 16 
members of the press; 
resulted in laboratory 
guidelines 
88 attendees; resulted 
in first rec. of product-
based regulation 
107 attendees; 
produced novelty rec., 
series of workshops 
to develop regulations 
Various attendees; 
resulted in Directive 
94-08, regulating plants 
with novel traits 
G. Bernardi (France) 
Institute de Biologie Moleculaire, 
Faculte des Sciences 
X X   
W. Gartland (USA) 
National Institutes of Health 
X X   
F. Young (USA) 
Department of Microbiology, 
University of Rochester 
X X   
V. Sgaramella (Italy) 
Instituto di Genetica 
X X   
T. McIntyre (Canada) 
Commercial Chemicals Branch, 
Environment Canada 
 X X  
D. B. Shindler (Canada) 
Canadian High Commission 
 X X  
W. Beversdorf (Canada) 
Department of Crop Science, 
University of Guelph 
  X X 
                                                          
5
 Taken from Appendix A of NAS (1975). 
6
 Taken from OECD (1986) appendices. 
7
 Taken from CARC (1988) appendices. 
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Following the advice and the work that came out of these workshops, Agriculture 
Canada’s Plant Biosafety Office8 released Directive 94-08 in December of 1994. Directive 94-08 
is officially titled “Assessment Criteria For Evaluating the Environmental Safety of Plants with 
Novel Traits” and has been updated three times since 1994, most recently in 2012 (Plant 
Biosafety Office 1994). It was the first regulatory rulemaking document to accompany the 
Government of Canada’s 1993 Federal Regulatory Framework for Biotechnology in Canada 
(CFIA 1993), a policy outlining government positions. Directive 94-08 is the document that first 
explicitly outlined the all-encompassing nature of the regulatory trigger for new agricultural bio-
products in Canada: novelty, regardless of the process of gene alteration.  
Canada’s regulatory system represents the institutionalization of the product approach 
which had been championed by the OECD in the 1980s. Table 3 provides a rough visualization 
of its diffusion through relevant documents and events, from the 1970s to the 2000s.  It began 
with discussions at an international level, with major scholarly events occurring in the 1970s.  
This was followed in the 1980s and early 1990s with reports on regulatory approaches from 
international bodies.  Legislation at the national level began in the 1990s in the United States and 
Canada, when both countries cemented their domestic institutionalization of the approach.  In the 
2000s, concerns around efficacy and efficiency within the context of the Canadian agricultural 
sector were raised.  The visualization itself is interesting, as it provides the opportunity to see 
how the product approach has diffused from international scholarship, to international 
organizations, through to the national government level and then to non-governmental fora 
where academic and industry stakeholders are engaged. 
 
                                                          
8
 The Plant Biosafety Office after 1997 was housed within the Canadian Food Inspection Agency, an independent 
agency reporting for 1997-2013 to the Minister of Agriculture and since then to the Minister of Health. 
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Table 3: Diffusion Visualization, 1970s-2000s (Canadian events in bold) 
 
 
TYPE 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Decisions   Approved field trials & 
release 
Approved field trials & release 
Directives   -1990: 90/220/EEC 
-1994: Dir94-08 
-1996: Dir96-13 
-1997: EC 258/97 Novel Food 
Regulation 
-2000: Dir94-08 reissue 
-2004: Dir94-08 reissue 
-2009: Dir2009-09 
Regulation  -1986 USA Coordinated 
Framework 
- 1993 Federal Regulatory 
Framework for 
Biotechnology (Canada) 
-1997 creation of CFIA 
-2004 Auditor General Report 
(Canada) 
Legislation -1972 PAG/UNU 
Guidelines 
-1983 PAG/UNU reissue 
-1985 Seeds Act (Canada) 
 
-1992 USA Policy Statement 
22984 (FDA 1992) 
-1992 CBD 
-1997 Seeds Regulations 
(Canada), esp. Part V 
-1997 NAFTA 
 
International 
Discussion 
-1973 Gordon 
Conference on 
Nucleic Acids 
-1974 Berg letter 
-1975 Asilomar 
Conference on rDNA 
-1982 Bull OECD: 
Biotech Trends 
-1986 rDNA Safety 
Considerations OECD 
-1991 FAO/WHO 
-1992 Earth Summit 
-1993 OECD Safety 
Evaluation of Foods Derived 
by Biotech 
-1993 OECD Scale-Up of 
Crop Plants 
 
Canadian 
Discussion 
 -1988 CARC Workshop -1993 CFIA workshops -2004 CFIA Conferences 
-2004 Seed Sector Review 
-2004 National Forum on Seed 
conference 
-2007 U of S/AgWestBio 
conference 
  
38 
 
The United States also followed the product-based method of regulation, although it was 
not interpreted in American regulations in the same way as in Canada. In the United States, the 
regulatory trigger for transgenic plants is plant pest potential and pathogenic presence (Monpetit 
2005).  
The other key element is the difference in the way the two countries utilize the concepts 
of familiarity and substantial equivalence. Familiarity, which was first used in the chemical 
industry (Barrett & Abergel 2000), is the “knowledge and experience” which can be applied to a 
new product for the purposes of risk analysis and management (OECD 1993a, p.28). This 
knowledge and experience is based upon a history of the seed, including specific cultivation 
practices and traits of similar non-modified crops. Similarly, substantial equivalence is decided 
based upon the “reasonable certainty of no harm [of a new product] as compared with its 
conventional or traditional counterpart” (OECD 1993b, p. 14). The Animal and Plant Health 
Inspection Service (APHIS) of the USDA utilizes familiarity, while the Food and Drug Agency 
uses substantial equivalence, both at the inception of decision-making. On the other hand, 
Canada’s utilization of these concepts is limited to within the risk assessment process itself, and 
not beforehand as a filter (see Table 4). It is this employment, as well as the ambiguity 
surrounding the pathogen regulatory trigger, which makes the United States’ regulatory policy 
more lenient for conventional breeders than that of Canada (Monpetit 2005). What results is the 
opportunity for a novel mutagenic plant to be able to escape the expensive and time consuming 
regulatory process in the United States, depending on its traits.  
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Table 4: Familiarity and Substantial Equivalence in Canada and the United States 
Term First used Who; how Canada uses Who; how USA uses 
Familiarity Chemical industry CFIA, Health Canada; 
within decision making 
process 
APHIS; beginning of 
decision making 
Substantial 
equivalence 
OECD 1993b FDA; beginning of 
decision making 
For example, in 2010 Dow AgroSciences developed a genetically modified corn variety 
using a new zinc-finger nuclease (ZFN) technique. It was not subjected to regulation by the 
USDA because it did not represent a plant pest or pathogenic threat (Waltz 2012). The same crop 
triggered the novelty requirement in Canada and needed to go through the Canadian regulatory 
system before commercialization or wide release. Additionally, crops created through older 
methods such as mutagenesis are generally considered novel in Canada but escape regulation in 
the United States (Ag West Bio 2007). A recent study conducted by CropLife International 
estimated the cost of getting a genetically modified crop through regulation to market to be 
approximately US$31.5 million, so this is not an insignificant difference (Phillips McDougall 
2011).
9
 Table 5 illustrates the Canadian, American, and European regulatory triggers as well as 
their stance toward GMOs. 
Table 5: Triggering mechanism for regulation: Canada, USA, and Europe
10
 
Country 
Stance on GMOs, as defined by 
Monpetit (2005) 
Trigger 
Canada Favourable Novelty of traits 
United States Favourable Plant pest potential; pathogen 
presence 
Europe Not favourable Method of production 
                                                          
9
 Commercialization is defined as a GMO which was approved in two producing countries and five importing 
countries. 
10
 Adopted from Monpetit 2005, pp.344-346. 
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The disparity in regulation between Canada and the United States is an issue on both 
sides of the border. Some argue that the United States at risk for allowing genetically modified 
products into the system untested, which may cause trade issues if this material is then triggered 
as a GMO import elsewhere (Lusser 2012). By contrast, Canada’s system may truly be ‘catch-
all’, but it runs the risk of being seen as having a less permissible regulatory landscape for both 
conventional breeders and biotechnologists involved with both traditional and very new 
techniques (such as synthetic biology). 
Diffusion 
 How is it possible that Canada, typically a policy-borrower country (Dolowitz & Marsh 
2000) with an established history of adopting American and American-led policy innovations 
(Hoberg 1991), ended up with a regulatory system unlike that of any other nation? In order to 
understand, it is prudent to examine the Canadian situation with the tools of policy learning, 
diffusion and innovation theory. 
  Biotechnology largely came to the attention of academics and policymakers in the 1970s, 
during a period of social and economic upheaval. The problems of the world had come to a head 
in a way they hadn’t before, due in part to increasing globalization and interconnectivity. The 
associated uncertainty found its way into academia, with the introduction of concepts like wicked 
or inherently unsolvable problems (Rittel & Webber 1973). However, the sudden ambiguity 
about the world left opportunities for scholars of both innovation policy and theory, including the 
not-often mentioned regulations that are sometimes associated with innovation. The disciplines 
evolved alongside one another and were significantly influenced by this period of dramatic 
change. 
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 It was at this point that actors outside the normal realm of policymaking began seeking 
what Mytelka and Smith (2002) call a “new innovation paradigm” (p. 1469), via collaboration 
with international organizations like the OECD and FAO. It was in these locales that consensus 
was primarily sought and built. Finding agreement and creating rules to keep up with the 
hastening pace of change in technology and the globalized economy became the primary role of 
these organizations and their members and partners. 
 However, to echo Beland (2009), while international actors such as IGOs are certainly 
important, sovereignty in lawmaking and enforcement lies ultimately with national governments. 
In interpreting advice from the OECD, FAO and other international organizations, policymakers 
within nations sometimes end up with policies and programs that look quite different from one 
another despite having nearly the same roots. In the case of novelty in Canada, policymakers 
took their cues from the country’s own specialists. Canada implemented a system that directly 
embodies the product-based approach, triggering regulation for any ‘new’ product regardless of 
technology or process used. Recommendations from the OECD stated that safety assessments 
should be the same for GM products as they are with conventional products, and this policy idea 
diffused directly.  
 It is here that the innovation literature may be able to assist in interpreting the limited 
diffusion of the novelty approach. After the development of an innovation, there is a period 
where a potential adopter undergoes what is known as the innovation-decision process. It is this 
process which is particularly interesting when applied in reference to the diffusion of the 
product-based approach. The process has five stages: knowledge, persuasion, decision, 
implementation, and confirmation (Rogers 2003).  
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 In the knowledge stage, an actor first becomes aware of an innovation. This is called 
awareness knowledge. Information on the uses of an innovation (how-to knowledge) as well as 
any theories underpinning the innovation (know-why/principles knowledge) also is brought 
forward in this stage. In the case of the product approach, this would include the period before 
and after the approach first was touted by the OECD. 
 In the next stage, the actor will develop either a positive or negative view of the 
innovation. This is done by seeking out “innovative evaluation information” (Rogers 2003, p. 
175). By acquiring qualifying information about the innovation, the actor is attempting to 
manage their uncertainty about adopting. This information is usually sought from peers instead 
of scientific journal sources because of peers’ perceived subjectivity. Interestingly, this idea is 
rendered moot in the case of the novelty approach, as the highly technical nature of the policy 
innovation limited the potential adopters’ peer group to the other members of a mostly academic 
community of educated experts. It was unavoidable to consult scientific sources because the 
content was such that the potential adopters either were themselves academics or had to consult 
with academic experts in order to ascertain an understanding of the innovation. 
 After coming to either a positive or negative conclusion about the innovation, the actor 
makes a decision. They may adopt it, either fully or partially, or reject it. Rejection can be 
passive, where the consideration that occurs is not very serious if at all, or active, where the 
decision not to adopt would be a more intentional, purposeful act. If adopting, an actor has two 
possible options: adopt the innovation as is, or adopt it after adapting it to the specific needs of 
the adopter. Occurring in the implementation stage, this adaptation is also known as reinvention 
(Rogers 2003). Innovations may not always fit neatly within an organization. Reinventing may 
be useful or, at times, necessary. The likelihood that an actor will reinvent an innovation upon 
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adoption is directly related to their adopter status vis-à-vis other actors. Early adopters are more 
likely to adapt an innovation, while those who adopt later are more likely to implement the 
innovation, unaltered (Westphal et al, 1997). Objectively, this is both true and false in the case of 
novelty. While the US did adopt first (with a degree of reinvention), if its adoption and that of 
Canada are placed in historical context, Canada would also be considered an early adopter. 
Canada’s early engagement with canola, a Canadian invention and arguably the first large area 
GM crop to be commercialized, made Canada an early-adopter with not only the specific 
product-based innovation, but with novel plants more broadly.  
 The final stage of the innovation-decision process is confirmation. In this stage, actors 
may reinvent based on experiences, seek more information, or cease using the innovation. Since 
the adoption of the novelty approach in Canada, there been further attempts made to clarify, 
understand and improve regulations. Most of these efforts have been undertaken by plant 
breeders’ associations on behalf of producers. For example, a workshop on the role of novelty in 
regulations of plants with novel traits was held by Ag West Bio and the University of 
Saskatchewan in 2007, where attendees discussed the existing issues and proposed a tiered 
approach to risk assessment of PNTs in an effort to address concerns. Questions continue to be 
asked and improvements continue to be sought, indicating that while those with authority (in this 
case, the government of Canada) may have completed the innovation-decision process, at least 
some affected actors have not.  
 This may potentially be explained when considering the type of decision that was 
undertaken in the novelty case. There are three types of innovation decisions to consider with 
regard to the adoption of an innovation: an optional innovation-decision, where the choice to 
adopt is made by an individual; a collective innovation-decision, where group consensus decides 
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whether adoption will take place; and an authority innovation-decision, where the a small 
number of people decide whether or not to adopt on behalf of everyone in the system (Rogers 
2003). The latter type, authority innovation-decisions, may include those which are made by 
elected representatives of a group. The decision of the Canadian government to adopt the 
novelty-based approach to regulation is an authority innovation-decision. Although the policy 
development process in this case, which included the consultation of experts and stakeholders via 
the CARC meeting and succeeding workshops, suggests initial consensus, the subsequent re-
evaluation of novelty by individuals and groups is evidence that differences did emerge later. 
 One intriguing aspect of this diffusion pattern is not so much the stakeholder 
consultation, nor the mirroring from international organizations and the epistemic community, 
but the fact that Canada and the United States did not harmonize on a common set of rules. 
When Rose’s (1993) degrees of transfer are applied to the experience of the US and Canada with 
the product approach, it is clear that Canada’s implementation is the closest to that which was 
proposed by the OECD, suggesting it should be categorized between replication and emulation. 
The trigger adopted by the US would place it between emulation and combination, as the viruses 
that are being detected by that trigger are not things that could be applied to conventional 
counterparts; this has been attributed to the influence in part by existing regulations about toxic 
substances utilized to regulate microbial GMOs (Levidow & Carr 2000).  
Shared values play an important role in lesson-drawing and policy diffusion (Rose 1991). 
Canada and the United States have a strong history of mutually embraced values making their 
regulatory disparity in this case particularly interesting. One perspective with respect to this lack 
of convergence comes from Hoberg, who discusses the history of what he calls Canada’s 
“constrained emulation” (1991, p. 126) of US environmental policy, with the notable exception 
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of institutional processes to avoid Americanization. The discrepancy in regulatory interpretation 
of biotechnology seems on the surface to be symptomatic of this. However, there is a contrasting 
perspective which argues that Canadian and American environmental policies are moving neither 
toward nor away from one another, but mutually toward a third path (Howlett 2000). 
Attempts have been made to move Canada and the U.S. toward that third path, at least 
with respect to regulatory policies. In 1998, representatives from the CFIA and Health Canada 
met in Ottawa to talk about regulatory cooperation with their counterparts with the USDA and 
APHIS. They discussed the harmonization of molecular genetic characterization and agreed upon 
methods of analyzing the genetic material that is submitted for regulatory approval, with a view 
that if the compliance requirements were the same or similar in both countries, proponents of 
transgenic crops would be more likely to make submissions for regulation in both the U.S. and 
Canada (CFIA et al., 1998).
11
 This work has continued with the standardization of laboratory 
methods under the auspices of the NAFTA Harmonization Council (CBSA 1998). 
Further to this, Canada has fallen behind on its internal commitments to the development 
of new regulations for novel animals and novel fish. In 1999, a date of February 2000 had been 
identified as the target release date for the publication of Health Canada’s Guidelines for the 
Safety Assessment of Novel Foods, Vol. III: Genetically Modified Livestock Animals and Fish 
(CBAC 2003). As of 2003, development of regulations for novel and cloned animals were stalled 
at the request of a proponent and dates for novel fish guidelines had been reset to June 2004 
(CBAC 2003). As of 2014, no such guidelines have been released and there are no target dates 
for any release. 
                                                          
11
 These requirements were updated in 2000 (CFIA et al 2000). 
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 The way that plants with novel traits are currently regulated in Canada allows the system 
and regulators to evolve in tandem with technology. Rather, the dominant issue with the system 
is that there are no other polities currently regulating agricultural products of biotechnology with 
the same comprehensive approach as in Canada. The United States, which is discussed in further 
detail elsewhere in this paper, utilizes plant pest potential and pathogenic presence to trigger 
regulatory oversight. Australia, which only recently allowed genetically modified crops, but has 
had a regulatory system in place for quite a few years, regulates GMOs based on the process 
used rather than the traits involved (OGTR 2000). Brazil, second in the world in terms of acreage 
of GM crops grown (Kaphengst et al. 2011), defines ‘genetically modified’ as being altered by 
DNA and RNA engineering techniques and regulates based on that (CTNBio 2005). Australia 
and Brazil, as well as other GM adopter countries like Argentina, India, Paraguay, South Africa 
and China, developed their regulations after Canada and none took its approach.  
 This may be explained by borrowing from the business and technology literature. Shapiro 
and Varian (1999) have a useful typology of advantages for proponents of a technology or 
innovation to hold in order to win a standards war. Their research is specifically related to 
technological battles such as Microsoft vs. Apple and Betamax vs. VCR technology, but can be 
broadly translated to policy innovation. One product may win a standards war over another, 
regardless of the whether the ‘winning’ product is actually objectively superior, for a variety of 
reasons. For example, in the 1930s, electric refrigerators won a standards war over gas 
refrigerators, despite the advantages that gas refrigerators offered. These included being less 
prone to breaking down due to its lack of moving parts, and running without the humming noise 
that accompanies electric-motor refrigerators. However, the large corporations who were 
investing in the research and development for these products determined that electric 
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refrigerators would result in a greater profit margin (Rogers 2003). Subsequently, more 
investment was made into electric refrigerators and they eventually became ubiquitous.  
Sharpiro and Varian (1999) propose seven criteria for winning a standards war, two of 
which are relevant for application to the issue of novelty and Canadian policy innovation. The 
first advantage is that of being the first-mover, or the first to adopt or introduce an innovation. 
While Canada and the US both integrated policy advice from IGOs and the epistemic community 
into their regulatory systems, the United States system was established prior to Canada’s. The 
second advantage, and perhaps the most important, is that of brand name and reputation. The 
United States is the world’s superpower, a dominant force in nearly every aspect of the 
globalized world and the world’s lead developer and adopter of GM crops. In comparison, 
Canada is not. While Canada was an inventor initially, its efforts have collapsed recently. 
Canada is now an adopter, not a leader. 
What Canada has is not so much a policy problem as it is a promotion problem. Policies 
are overwhelmingly drawn and emulated from nations or states similar in a variety of ways to 
potential adopter polities. If Canadian policy is similar in characteristic to that of the United 
States, differing mainly in institutionalization and implementation, as Hoberg (1991) claims, and 
GMO adopter countries are more closely following the American approach to regulation of novel 
bioproducts than they are the Canadian approach, then it can be concluded that Canada has lost 
the standards war with the United States to be the representative polity of those ideals. Like the 
Betamax experience illustrates, superior technology does not always guarantee a win. Potential 
adopters of GM regulatory policy look to the United States to draw lessons and emulate policy, 
ignoring Canada because of its lower international profile, even though, as discussed above, the 
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policy has the potential to be more responsive to changes in the technology that could change 
risks.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
The product-based approach to regulation, which was built on advice sourced from 
international organizations and experts in the field, successfully managed to diffuse from 
consensus-building institutions like the OECD and into authoritative regulation in countries like 
the United States and Canada. This occurred largely because of the relatively small size of 
biotechnology’s epistemic community and its members’ interconnectivity during regulatory 
construction. The Canadian system has the most technically accurate institutionalization of this 
idea; however, interestingly, other countries have not elected to emulate its widely-encompassing 
regulatory oversight trigger. The presence of both success and failure makes it a particularly 
useful case study with which to evaluate the interrelated policy diffusion, policy learning, and 
policy innovation literature. These characteristics also allow for the evaluation of the research 
methodologies of policy diffusion, and to test for their applicability to a case study such as the 
one outlined in this paper.  
There are three main parts to the problem presented in this thesis.  The first aspect to be 
considered is the product-based approach to regulation itself and its status as a policy innovation.  
The second is the differing adaptations of that policy by two countries, Canada and the United 
States, and the problems presented by their dissimilarity. The third and final part of the issue is 
the diffusion – or lack thereof – of the Canadian institutionalization of their product-based 
approach versus others.  The theories that were reviewed and employed here each explained 
parts of the issue, but none on its own would fully amplify my case. 
The historical method is the only diffusion methodology that is easily applied to an ex-
post study of agricultural biotechnology regulatory diffusion, but it is not without its weaknesses. 
It is particularly susceptible to what is referred to as the respondent recall problem. The 
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respondent recall problem is the difficulty involved in attempting to study the diffusion of a 
particular innovation or policy after the fact. Personal interviews and individual responses are not 
always reliable, and become less so as the amount of time that has passed since adoption 
increases (Rogers 2003). Additionally, retrospective studies of innovations, because of their 
reliance on documents available, generally have a greater focus on the research and development 
of an innovation and significantly less on its diffusion, which results partly in issues surrounding 
ascertainment of causality.  
This is certainly true in the case of the diffusion of the product-based approach. Even 
considering the difficulty of ascertaining primary source material from before personal 
computers were widespread (compared to the relative ease of doing so after, when documents are 
more readily available and searchable), there is more documentation available from the product 
approach’s early years in international organizations and less so from after it became established 
within government, including how it got to be there in the first place. However, it is difficult to 
tell whether this is more a commentary on the public availability of information from 
international organizations and academic institutions versus the behaviour of domestic 
governments with the same material, or an observation on the innovation diffusion process itself. 
While quantifiable diffusion methods such as event history analysis are fairly accurate 
when it comes to studies involving intra-country state-to-state diffusion, they do not work well in 
an international case with data availability constraints such as this. The advantage that event 
history analysis has in intra-country state-to-state diffusion cases is that there is an automatic risk 
set, or group of states that are susceptible for policy adoption, and that all of these states are 
identical in institutional construct. The trouble arises when an attempt is made to apply the 
statistical methods of event history analysis to inter-country diffusion. Barriers include the 
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inconsistency of data, with both collection method and availability issues; differences in 
government structures; conflict with differing jurisdictional authority within nations; 
dissimilarity in organizational cultures, and variance in the way that things like regulations are 
administered. There are too many variables that are dissimilar to compare adequately among 
countries, and thus this type of analysis does not lend any predictability or explanatory power to 
diffusion cases like Canadian agricultural biotechnology regulation. 
Furthermore, statistical models say nothing about the initial policy innovation itself, only 
what can happen to that policy afterward. While diffusion is important to understand, there are 
significant advantages to being an innovation pioneer, particularly in policy. Better 
understanding how policy innovation and invention occurs may perhaps lend another dimension 
to the idea of diffusion and predictability of specific outcomes. As it stands, the limited literature 
around policy innovation does not have many generally useful quantitative methods. The 
existing qualitative research is either anecdotal in nature or will require extensive work before 
predictive models can be developed. 
The innovation diffusion literature has elements which can be applied to policy 
innovation, albeit qualitatively. Everett Rogers (2003) warns against the biases existing in 
innovation diffusion literature, specifically its positive stance toward innovations themselves. 
Scholars of diffusion tend overwhelmingly to favour the permeation of an innovation throughout 
a network, and that it should do so in its current state, without reinvention. This is partly due to 
the statistical analysis possible in tracing and measuring rates of adoption and other benchmarks. 
Innovations which do not work and do not diffuse, while potentially very informative, are not as 
easily lent to quantitative methods of diffusion such as event history analysis. 
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Additionally, while the innovation diffusion literature can tell us much about why good 
innovations diffuse and the processes that they go through as they become more widespread and 
popular, it is less helpful when addressing why good innovations do not diffuse. Rogers (2003) 
touches on this briefly when he discusses research and development investment in standard wars 
between variations on innovations, such as electric versus gas refrigerators, but apart from first-
mover advantage and brand status criteria from Shapiro and Varian (1999), much of the 
innovation, business and technology literature is not easily translatable to the policy realm.  
Neither the existing research methods in the policy diffusion literature nor in the 
innovation diffusion literature are very useful when seeking to understand how innovative 
policies and regulations are constructed, particularly with regard to transformative technologies 
like biotechnology. In cases where there is a high level of technical knowledge required for 
decision making, such as with biotechnology or nanotechnology, it is necessary to consult with 
individuals who have recognized expertise in those areas. International organizations with foci 
on research for consensus building like the OECD, WHO and FAO thus can play vital roles as 
the institutional home of networks of experts.  
When it comes to the diffusion and adoption of policy for these types of innovations, 
however, the onus is on governments of sovereign nations and associated departments to 
interpret recommendations in the most appropriate way, given contextual and national 
characteristics. In Canada’s case, this may have meant a fully science-based, novelty-trigger 
regulatory system. However, a comprehensive analysis of potential consequences of the lack of 
regulatory harmony with important trading partners, specifically the United States, may have 
helped avoid some of the issues that it is currently facing. Even if Canada’s system could be 
objectively proven to the best, the presence of a strong policy paradigm leaves a government less 
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vulnerable to outside pressure (Hall 1993). The United States’ strong presence in international 
policy arenas contributes to that kind of a paradigm, and thus it will probably be Canada that will 
have to make regulatory amendments if harmony is to be attained. 
There are many theories and bodies of literature that I did not examine in the process of 
this thesis, including behavioural economics, agenda-setting, neorealism, complexity, and 
institutional analysis.  Any number of these may offer insights and may serve to support the 
further study of innovative policies and their diffusion pathways throughout a relevant system. 
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APPENDIX A: CONFERENCE ATTENDEES LIST 
0. National Academy of Sciences – International Conference on Recombinant DNA 
Molecules 
February 24-27, 1975 (Asilomar, California) (Taken from NAS 1975) 
Attendee Affiliation 
Organizing Committee 
Paul Berg, Chairman 
 
Department of Biochemistry, Stanford 
University Medical Centre, Stanford, 
California 
David Baltimore 
 
Center for Cancer Research, Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts 
Sydney Brenner Medical Research Council Laboratory for 
Molecular Biology, Cambridge, England 
Niels K. Jerne Basel Institute for Immunology, Basel, 
Switzerland 
Richard O. Roblin III Harvard Medical School and Massachusetts 
General Hospital, Boston, Massachusetts 
Maxine F. Singer Laboratory of Biochemistry and Metabolism, 
National Institute of Arthritis and Metabolic 
Disease, National Institutes of Health, 
Bethesda, Maryland 
NAS-NRC Staff 
Artemis. P. Simopoulos Division of Medical Sciences, National 
Research Council, National Academy of 
Sciences, Washington, D.C. 
Elena O. Nightingale Division of Medical Sciences, National 
Research Council, National Academy of 
Sciences, Washington, D.C. 
Howard Lewis Press Office, National Academy of Sciences, 
Washington, D.C. 
Foreign Participants (non-U.S.) 
Ephraim S. Anderson Enteric Reference Laboratory, Public Health 
Laboratory Service, London, England 
Toshiko Arai Department of Microbiology, Keio University 
Shinjuku, Tokyo, Japan 
Werner Arber Department of Microbiology, University of 
Basel, Basel, Switzerland 
A.A. Bayov Institute of Molecular Biology, Moscow, 
USSR 
Douglas Berg Departement de Biologie Moleculaire, 
University de Geneve, Geneva, Switzerland 
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Yuriy A. Berlin M.M. Shemyakin Institute of Biorganic 
Chemistry, Academy of Sciences of the USSR, 
Moscow, USSR 
G. Bernardi Institute de Biologie Moleculaire, Faculte des 
Sciences, Paris, France 
Max Birnstiel Institute of Molecular Biology, University of 
Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland 
Walter F. Bodmer Genetics Laboratory, Department of 
Biochemistry, Oxford, England 
N.H. Carey G.D. Scarle and Company, Ltd., Research 
Division, Bucks, England 
Y.A. Chabbert Bacteriology Department, Institut Pasteur, 
Paris, France 
Ray Dixon ARC Unit of Nitrogen Fixation, University of 
Sussex, Brighton, England 
W.A. Englehardt Institute of Molecular Biology, Academy of 
Sciences of the USSR, Moscow, USSR 
Walter Fiers Laboratorium voor Moleculaire Biologie, 
Ghent, Belgium 
Murray J. Fraser Department of Biochemistry, McGill 
University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada 
W. Gayewski Department of Genetics, Warsaw University, 
Ujazdowskie, Poland 
Stuart W. Glover Department of Genetics, University of 
Newcastle-upon-Tyne, England 
Walter Goubel Gesellschait fur Molekularbiologische 
Forschung, Braunschwieg, West Germany 
Carlton Gyles Department of Veterinary Microbiology and 
Immunology, University of Guelph, Guelph, 
Ontario, Canada 
Gerd Hobom Institut fur Biologie II der Universitat Freiburg, 
Freiburg, West Germany 
Peter H. Hofschneider Max-Planck-Institut fur Biochemie, Munchen, 
West Germany 
Bruce W. Hollaway Department of Genetics, Monash University, 
Victoria, Australia 
H.S. Jansz Netherlands Biochemical Society, c/o 
Vendellan 24
A
, Netherlands 
Mikhail N. Kolosov M.M. Shemyakin Institute of Biorganic 
Chemistry, Academy of Sciences of the USSR, 
Moscow, USSR 
Philippe Kourilsky Institut Pasteur, Paris, France 
Ole Maaloe Department of Microbiology, University of 
Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark 
Alastair T. Matheson Division of Biological Sciences, National 
Research Council, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada 
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Kenichi Matsubara Department of Biochemistry, Kyushu 
University, Fukuoka, Japan 
Andrey D. Mirzabekov Institute of Molecular Biology, Academy of 
Sciences of the USSR, Moscow, USSR 
Kenneth Murray Department of Molecular Biology, University 
of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, Scotland 
Ramon Naranjo Guadalajara University, Guadalajara, Mexico 
James Peacock Division of Plant Industries, CSIRO, Canberra 
City, Australia 
Lennart Philipson Department of Microbiology, the Wallenberg 
Laboratory, Uppsala University, Uppsala, 
Sweden 
James Pitard Department of Microbiology, University of 
Melbourne, Parkville, Victoria, Australia 
Mark H. Richmond Department of Bacteriology, University of 
Bristol, Bristol, England 
A. Rorsch Department of Biochemistry, Leiden State 
University, Leiden, Netherlands 
Vittorio Sgaramella Instituto di Genetica, Pavia, Italy 
Luigi G. Silvestri Gruppo Lepetit, Milano, Italy 
Lou Simonovitch Department of Medical Genetics, University of 
Toronto, Ontario, Canada 
H. Williams Smith Houghton Poultry Research Station, 
Huntingdon, England 
Peter Starlinger Institut fur Genetik der Universitat Koln, Koln, 
West Germany  
Pierre Tiollais Institut Pasteur, Paris, France 
Alfred Tissieres Department de Biologie Moleculaire Sciences, 
Universite de Geneve, Geneve, Switzerland 
John Tooze EMBO, Heidelberg, West Germany 
Alex J. Van der Eb Laboratory of Physiological Chemistry, 
Leiden, The Netherlands 
Charles Weissmann Institut für Molekularbiologie, Universität 
Zurich, Switzerland 
Robert Williamson Beatson Hospital, Glasgow, Scotland 
Ernest Winocour Department of Genetics, Weizmann Institute of 
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